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Notes:
TERMINATION LIABILITY UNDER TITLE IV
OF ERISA: IMPACT ON COMPANIES
UNDER COMMON CONTROL
Ambiguities within section 4062 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) pose substantial problems of interpretation.A major question arises as to
who may be liablefor the payment of guaranteedbenefits upon the terninationof a
pension plan. One interpretation would hold all companies within a comuon control group liablefor the ternination obligations of any other member of the group.
The author analyzes the statute, rejecting such an interpretation as irreconcilable
with the intent of ERISA and longstanding policies, and proposes an alternative
construction of the liability-imposing language of section 4062.

On one side hung a very large oilpainting so thoroughly besmoked, and every way defaced, that in the unequal cross-lights by
which you viewed it, it was only by diligent study and a series of
systematic visits to it, and careful inquiry of the neighbors, that
you could any way arrive at an understanding of its purpose. Herman Melville, Moby-Dick.
I. INTRODUCTION

THE

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT of

19741 (ERISA)

is the first federal statute to comprehensively regulate private pension
plans. While ERISA was pending, a primary concern of Congress was the
potential financial impact of the proposed statute upon businesses. 2 Despite
the elapse of three years since ERISA's enactment, unresolved questions
about how the complex and intricate provisions of the statute will apply
leave the extent of its financial impact on businesses uncertain. The scope
and extent of the liability that ERISA imposes upon businesses that maintain
plans when those plans are subsequently terminated remains to be determined.
Section 4062 of ERISA provides that employers "who maintained a pension plan . .. at the time it was terminated" may be liable under ERISA

1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 18, 26, 29, 31, 42
U.S.C.) [hereinafter cited as ERISA]. Throughout this Note citations will be to sections of
ERISA, as enacted, and to relevant sections of U.S.C.
2. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, ADDITIONAL WRITTEN STATEMENTS SUBMTTED BY INTERESTED ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ON H.R. 10470, 93d Cong., 1st

Sess. (1973).
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upon plan termination. 3 Since the incidence of liability under this provision
depends on the meaning of "employer who maintained a pension plan," a
preliminary question in any application of the provision is the nature and
degree of the connection between an employer and a plan which constitutes
maintaining a plan. A specific, unresolved issue within the broader question
is whether companies which did not contribute to or otherwise administer a
terminated plan, whose only relation to the plan is that they are under
common control with the company which actually maintained the terminated
4
plan, will be liable.
Following a sketch of ERISA's structure, this Note analyzes section 4062,
related provisions, and legislative history, to determine who should be subject to plan termination liability. Also considered are the constitutionality
and policy implications of an interpretation of section 4062 that would impose liability on companies which did not contribute to or otherwise administer a terminated pension plan. The Note concludes that plan termination liability under ERISA section 4062 should be limited to individuals and
businesses who, as employers, actually participated in maintaining the terminated plan.
II.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

A. Structure of ERISA
In drafting ERISA, Congress attempted to design a comprehensive
framework to secure a more equitable establishment and administration of
private pension plans. 5 To this end, the Act provides plan participants with
a number of new rights and remedies. Title 1,6 the first of four major parts
of ERISA, sets forth a number of specific requirements for reporting and
disclosure, participation and vesting, funding, and administration. Title III
revises the requirements for tax qualification of pension plans under the Internal Revenue Code. Noncomplying plans forfeit the special tax treatment
which is a major incentive to maintaining private pension plans. Title 1118
3. ERISA, § 4062, 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (Supp. V 1975). Termination liability attaches only
when the terminated plan has insufficient assets to cover guaranteed benefits.
4. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), which administers plan termination
insurance under Title IV of ERISA, has asserted liability against noncontributing companies
under common control. See note 19 infra.
Subsections 414(b) and (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the regulations promulgated
thereunder, define corporations as well as trades and businesses under common control. For
the purposes of this Note these common control groups are referred to as "companies under
common control."
5. ERISA, § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (Supp. V 1975).
6. Id., Pub. L. No. 93-406, tit. I, §§ 2-514, 88 Stat. 829, 832-97 (codified in scattered
sections of 5, 18, 29 U.S.C.).
7. Id., tit. II, §§ 1001-2008, 88 Stat. 829, 898-994 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 26,
31, 42 U.S.C.).
8. Id., tit. III, §§ 3001-43, 88 Stat. 829, 995-1003 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29

U.S.C.).
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establishes procedures to facilitate the coordination of the various agencies
involved in enforcing ERISA. Title IV9 establishes, for the first time, a system of plan termination insurance.

B. Title IV Liability
In response to a finding "that owing to the termination of plans before
requisite funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries
have been deprived of anticipated benefits"o10 under private pension plans,
Congress created the system of federal pension plan termination insurance
contained in Title IV of ERISA. In Title IV Congress also established the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to administer the insurance
system." Subject to certain limitations, the PBGC insures the payment of
pension benefits when covered 1 2 pension plans are terminated. 13
In the event of the termination of a covered plan the PBGC determines
whether the plan has sufficient funds to pay all the benefits which the PBGC
is required to guarantee under section 4022 of ERISA.1 4 If the plan's funds
are insufficient, the PBGC must pay the guaranteed benefits.' 5 In order to
finance such payments the PBGC collects insurance premiums from
employers who maintain covered pension plans. 16 In addition, an employer
who maintained a plan which terminates with insufficient funds incurs liability under ERISA section 4062 and must reimburse the PBGC for the bene7
fits paid in an amount up to 30% of the employer's net worth.'
9. Id. §§ 4001-82, 88 Stat. 829, 1003-35 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 26, 29, 31

U.S.C.).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

ERISA, § 2(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 4002, 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 4021, 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 4022, 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (Supp. V 1975).
Id.
Id. § 4061, 29 U.S.C. § 1361 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. §§ 4006-07, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1306-07 (Supp. V 1975).
Id. § 4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (Supp. V 1975).
The employer is liable to the PBGC rather than to the beneficiaries under the plan. The
burden of suing is thus on the PBCC rather than on individual beneficiaries. Such an arrangement permits the consolidation of individual claims into a single claim by the PBGC against the
employer and expedites an eventual payment of individual pension benefits. The collection of
any claims against an employer is further facilitated by the provision for a lien on the employer's
property in favor of the PBGC. See ERISA § 4068, 29 U.S.C. § 1368 (Supp. V 1975).
In order to lighten the new burden of termination liability, section 4062 imposes a 30%
limitation on liability and section 4023 charges the PBGC with providing contingent liability
insurance for employers and assessing the premiums necessary to fund the coverage. ERISA, §
4023, 29 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. V 1975). Unfortunately, the PBC will not make such insurance
available until September, 1977, at the earliest. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORAION, OPINION LETTER

No. 76-27, at 3 (1976). Moreover, coverage under such insurance

would begin only after an employer had paid insurance premiums for a five-year period. ERISA, § 4023(d), 29 U.S.C. § 133(d) (Supp. V 1975). Contingent liability coverage, therefore, will
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Although section 4062 imposes liability on an employer who maintains a
plan which is terminated, it does not specify what maintaining a plan entails."' To determine who may be liable under the statute it is necessary to
first determine who is considered under the statute to be an employer who
maintains a plan.
A straightforvard interpretation of the statutory language would indicate
that persons or companies employing individuals on whose behalf they establish, contribute to, or administer pension plans are employers who maintain
those plans. This interpretation would limit liability for the obligations of a
particular plan to companies participating in that plan by establishing, contributing to, or administering it.
The PBGC, however, construes the language of section 4062 to impose
liability on a much larger group of businesses. The PBGC contends that the
language "employer who maintained the plan" includes all companies within
a common control group, regardless of their participation in a particular
terminated plan. The PBGC argues that section 4001(b) of ERISA requires
this interpretation of the "employer who maintained the plan" language in
section 4062.19 Section 4001(b) provides:
For purposes of this title, under regulations prescribed by the corporation [PBGC], all employees of trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated
as employed by a single employer and all such trades or businesses
probably not provide coverage for any employer until 1982, although such insurance could be
available in 1979 if the PBGC allows the retroactive payment of premiums. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, OPINION LETTER No. 76-27, at 3 (1976). ERISA contains a
suggestion that employers may purchase private insurance coverage as an alternative to the
contingent liability insurance provided by the PBGC. ERISA, § 4023(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1323(c)
(Supp. V 1975). Private insurers have been reluctant to underwrite such policies, however,
because the insured event is within the insured's control. Conversation with Staff Attorney,
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (Feb. 21, 1977).
18. ERISA section 4062 liability applies to: "[A]ny employer who maintained a plan (other
than, a multiemployer plan) at the time it was terminated ..
" ERISA, § 4062(a), 29 U.S.C.
1362(a) (Supp. V 1975); "[Ain employer who withdraws from a plan ... during a plan year for
which he was a substantial employer ..
." Id., § 4063(b), 29 U.S.C. 1363(b) (Supp. V 1975);
"[AIIl employers who maintain a plan under which more than one employer makes contributions at the time such plan is terminated or who at any time within the five plan years preceding the date of termination, made contributions under the plan." Id., § 4064(a), 29 U.S.C.
1364(a) (Supp. V 1975).
19. See Complaint and Application for Expedited Handling at 3, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Apr. 2, 1976). Amended Complaint
Seeking Relief from Stay at 2, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Tenn-ERO Corp., No. 751520-HL (D. Mass., filed Apr. 27, 1976), succinctly states the argument:
Trades or businesses under common control are treated as a single employer
for purposes of Title IV, Act § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b). As trades or businesses
under common control within the meaning of that Section, Ouimet Corporation,
Ouimet Stay and Leather Company, Ouimet Welting Company, Avon Sole Company and Tenn-ERO Corporation . . . are the employer that maintained the Plan at
the time it was terminated.
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as a single employer. The regulations prescribed under the preceding sentence shall be consistent and coextensive with the regulations prescribed for similar purposes by the Secretary of the Treasury under section 414(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.20
The PBGC reasons that the section 4001(b) provision for "single employer"
treatment of companies under common control requires all such companies
to be treated as the "employer who maintained a plan." By this reasoning,
all companies in a control group are jointly and severally responsible for any
termination liability which accrues to any company in the group whose pen21
sion plan terminates with insufficient funds to pay guaranteed benefits.
To reach this result, the PBGC assumes that the word "employer" in section
4062 incorporates or is equivalent to the term "single employer" in section
4001(b). The PBGC finds apparent support for its assumption in the HouseSenate Conference Report on section 4062,22 which states:
In determining the employer who may be liable for insurance
coverage losses of the corporation [PBGC], all trades and businesses (whether or not incorporated)
under common control are to be
23
treated as a single employer.
The PBGC has relied on this interpretation of section 4062 in a test case
to assert liability against a group of corporations under common control with
a bankrupt corporation whose pension plan terminated.2 4 The bankrupt
corporation, the Avon Sole Company, established the plan for its employees
prior to the passage of ERISA.2 5 The group of commonly controlled corporations includes a subsidiary of Avon Sole (Tenn-ERO Corporation), Avon
Sole's parent company (Ouimet Corporation), and two of Ouimet's sister
corporations (Ouimet Stay and Leather Company and Ouimet Welting
Company).2 6 Despite the fact that Avon Sole alone established, adminis20. ERISA, § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (Supp. V 1975).
21. Complaint and Application for Expedited Handling at 3, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Apr. 2, 1976).
22. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, S. REP. No. 93-1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038.
23. Id. at 376, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 5155.
24. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Apr.
2, 1976).
25. Complaint and Application for Expedited Handling at 2, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Apr. 2, 1976).
26. Pre-Trial Memorandum of Plaintiff at 2, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Tenn-ERO
Corp., No. 75-1520-HL (D. Mass., filed May 26, 1976), reads as follows:
The Avon Sole Company ... is a Massachusetts corporation that had been
engaged in the business of manufacturing shoe parts in this Commonwealth.
Tenn-ERO Corporation .. . also a Massachusetts corporation and a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Avon Sole, engaged in the same business at a facility located in Tennessee. At all pertinent times, Ouimet Corporation . . . has owned 100% of the
stock of Avon Sole; Mr. Emil Ouimet owned 98% of the stock of Ouimet and 81.5%
of the stock of Ouimet Stay and Leather Company ....
which owned 100% of the
stock of Ouimet Welting Company ....
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tered, and contributed to the pension plan, 2 7 the PBGC has asserted joint
and several liability under section 4062 against Tenn-ERO, Ouimet, Ouimet
Leather, and Ouimet Welting. 28 The defendant companies have challenged
the statutory foundation and constitutional validity of the PBGC interpretation of section 4062.29 As this Note will demonstrate, the companies' claims
are valid and their interpretation is consistent with the plan of ERISA.
III. STATUTORY ANALYSIS

A determination of whether the PBGC construction of section 4062 to
impose liability on companies which did not actually maintain a terminated
pension plan is consistent with the intent of Title IV requires close examination of the language and legislative history of the statutory provisions which
arguably support that construction. These provisions include the definitional
section of Title IV (section 4001) as well as the sections imposing termination
liability (sections 4062 and 4064).
A. The Function of Section 4001(b)
According to the PBGC, section 4001(b) of ERISA governs section 4062,
making an entire control group the "employer who maintained a plan,"
27. See Answer of Defendants at 3, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No.
76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Jul. 19, 1976).
28. Complaint and Application for Expedited Handling at 3, Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No. 76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Apr. 2, 1976).
29. Answer of Defendants at 2-3, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Ouimet Corp., No.
76-1314-T (D. Mass., filed Jul. 19, 1976).
While this Note was in galleys, Harold Lavien, the Bankruptcy Judge and Special Master appointed by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, rendered
his opinion in PBGC v. Avon Sole Company, et al., Bankruptcy No. 75-1520-HL (D. Mass.
May 13, 1977)., which constitutes the Master's report in PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., et al., C. A.
No. 76-1314-T.
After careful examination of the express statutory language of ERISA, its legislative history and the public policies it is intended to advance, the Court is convinced
that ERISA § 4062 levies liability for the PBGC's assumption of pension plan payments only against the person or corporation acting directly as an employer in relation to an employee benefit plan, or, as provided in § 4062(d), against certain successor in interest corporations when the direct plan employer attempts to avoid
liability.
PBGC v. Avon Sole Company, et al., No. 75-1520-HL, slip op. at D-7 (D. Mass. May 13,
1977). The use of the term "direct plan employer" is synonomous with the concept "actually
maintaining the plan" used in this Note. Judge Lavien supports his conclusion with a thorough
and insightful analysis of the statutory language, the legislative history of ERISA, and the public
policies underpinning ERISA. Holding that to be liable under section 4062 an employer must
be "the direct employer and not some stranger to the plan beneficiaries who becomes the
employer through control group theory," id. at D-9, Judge Lavien decided that only the Avon
Sole Company and its wholly owned subsidiary Tenn-ERO corporation would be liable under
section 4062 of ERISA. Tenn-ERO was held, not as a control group member, but on the theory
that "[alithough separate in name, the companies were for all practical purposes one, and have
so been treated by all parties throughout these proceedings." Id. at D-3.
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whether or not more than one individual member of the group actually
maintained the plan. Whether the rule of construction in section 4001(b)
may be interpreted to govern section 4062 in this manner is questionable.
Section 4001 is divided -into two sections: 4001(a), which specifically defines
seven terms, including "substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan;'"
30
Section 4001(b) conand section 4001(b), which contains no definitions.
sists of two statements explaining how employers and employees are to be
"treated" in certain circumstances. The second of these statements specifies
that trades and businesses under common control are to be treated as a
"single employer." This rule of construction forms the basis of the PBGC's
interpretation of section 4062.
The legislative development of section 4001 gives some indication of its
meaning and function. Earlier versions of ERISA contained a definitional
section corresponding to section 4001(a) but rendering the definitions in
slightly different terms. 3 1 No early references to "single employer" treat30. See. 4001. (a) For purposes of this title, the term(1) "administrator" means the person or persons described in paragraph (16)
of section 3 of this Act;
(2) "substantial employer" means for any plan year an employer (treating
employers who are members of the same affiliated group, within the meaning of
section 1563(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, determined without regard
to section 1563(a)(4) and (e)(3)(C) of such Code, as one employer) who has made
contributions to or under a plan under which more than one employer makes
contributions for each of(A) the two immediately preceding plan years, or
(B) the second and third preceding plan years, equaling or exceeding 10
percent of all employer contributions paid to or under that plan for each such
year;
(3) "multiemployer plan" means a multiemployer plan as defined in section
414(0 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (as added by this Act but without
regard to whether such section is in effect on the date of enactment of this Act);
(4) "corporation", except where the context clearly requires otherwise, means
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation established under section 4002;
(5) "fund" means the appropriate fund established under section 4005;
(6) "basic benefits" means benefits guaranteed under section 4022 other than
under section 4022(c); and
(7) "non-basic benefits" means benefits guaranteed under section 4022(c).
See. 4001. (b) An individual who owns the entire interest in an unincorporated
trade or business is treated as his own employer, and a partnership is treated as
the employer of each partner who is an employee within the meaning of section
401(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. For purposes of this title, under
regulations prescribed by the corporation, all employees of trades or businesses
(whether or not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as
employed by a single employer and all such trades and businesses as a single
employer. The regulations prescribed under the preceding sentence shall be consistent and coextensive with regulations prescribed for similar purposes by the
Secretary of the Treasury under section 414(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954.
31. The definitional provisions under section 401(a) as set out in H.R. 2 were as follows:
(2) "substantial employer" means any employer (treating employers which are members of the same affiliated group, within the meaning of section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as one employer .... (3) "multiemployer plan" means a
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ment of trades and businesses under common control appear. The HouseSenate conferees added section 4001(b), with its reference to "single
employer" treatment just before the enactment of ERISA. 32 Although the
conferees gave no explanation for this last minute change, other changes
made in section 4001 at the same time provide a clue to the function of
section 4001(b).
The simultaneous changes included rewording of the section 4001(a) definitions of "substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan." 33 The conferees appear to have changed the definitions to mak6 them consistent with
the definitions of "multiemployer plan" which appear in other sections of
ERISA 34 unrelated to termination liability. The revised version of section
4001(a) (3) defined "multiemployer plan" by reference to a new section that
ERISA had added to the Internal Revenue Code-IRC section 414(f). Section 414() sets forth a comprehensive definition of "multiemployer plan,"
including a requirement that more than one employer contribute to such a
plan. Section 414(f)(2)(B) contains a "special rule" of construction, which provides: "All corporations which are members of a controlled group of corporations (within the meaning of section 1563(a)) . . .shall be deemed to be one
employer." 35 This rule of construction has two significant ramifications:
first, pension plans maintained exclusively within a group of commonly controlled corporations cannot be considered multiemployer plans; second,
members of a commonly controlled group of corporations participating in a
pension plan with companies outside their control group are treated as a
36
single employer for purposes of applying the multiemployer rules.
The incorporation of the section 414() definition into section 4001(a) produced a definition of "multiemployer plan" for the purposes of Title IV
which treated corporations under common control as "one employer," so as
to exclude plans maintained exclusively by companies in a single common
control group from multiemployer treatment, but did not make any provision for plans maintained by unincorporated trades and businesses under

plan which the corporation determines is a plan to which more than one employer
(treating employers who are members of the same affiliated group within the meaning of section 1504(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as one employer) is
required to contribute ....
H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 4987 (1974).
32. Compare ERISA, § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (Supp. V 1975), with H.R. 2, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., 120 CONG. REc. 4987 (1974).
33. Compare ERISA, § 4001(a)(2)-(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2)-(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975), with
H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 401(a)(2)-(a)(3), 120 CONG. REC. 4987 (1974).
34. See ERISA § 3(37), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (Supp. V 1975); ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
§ 1015, 88 Stat. 927 (amending I.R.C. § 414(o).
35. I.R.C. § 414()(2)(B). Since I.R.C. § 1563(a) applies only to businesses operating as corporations, I.R.C. § 414(l)(2)(B) only covers corporations.
36. See ERISA, § 4064, 29 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. V 1975).
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common control. Taken alone, the section 4001(a) definition of multiemployer plan would have produced an anomolous situation with respect to
the determination of multiemployer plan status under Title IV: corporations
under common control would be treated as a single employer while unincorporated trades and businesses under common control would not.
In the drafting of sections 414(b) and (c), which ERISA section 1015 also
added to the Internal Revenue Code, a similar problem had arisen.37 Section 414(b) provides that, for the purposes of the Code provisions on qualification of plans, minimum participation standards, minimum vesting standards, and limits on benefits and contributions under qualified plans,
employees of corporations under common control within the meaning of section 1563(a) are to be "treated as employed by a single employer." 3 8 Section 414(c) gives the rule of section 414(b) broader application by extending
it to "employees of trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated) which
are under common control." 39 Without the addition of section 414(c), section 414(b)-like the definition of "multiemployer plans" in section 414(o
and section 4001(a)-would only extend single employer treatment to corporations under common control. This would leave unspecified whether or not
unincorporated trades and businesses under common control should be
treated as a single employer.
37. I.R.C. § 414(b)-(c), as amended by ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 1015, 88 Stat. 926,
reads as follows:
§ 414(b) Employees of controlled group of corporations.
For purposes of sections 401, 410, 411 and 415, all employees of all corporations (within the meaning of section 1563(a), determined without regard to section
156 3(a)(4) and (e)(3)(C)) shall be treated as employed by a single employer. With
respect to a plan adopted by more than one such corporation, the minimum funding
standard of section 412, the tax imposed by section 4971, and the applicable limitations provided by section 404(a) shall be determined as if all such employers were a
single employer, and allocated to each employer in accordance with regulations
prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
§ 414(c) Employees of partnerships, proprietorships, etc. which are under common
control.
For purposes of section 401, 410, 411, and 415, under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary or his delegate, all employees of trades or businesses (whether or
not incorporated) which are under common control shall be treated as employed by
a single employer. The regulations prescribed under this subsection shall be based
on principles similar to the principles which apply in the case of subsection(b).
38. I.R.C. § 414(b).
39. I.R.C. § 414(c). HousE REPORT No. 93-807 indicates the relation of section 414(c) to
414(b):
[I]f two or more corporations were members of a parent-subsidiary, brother-sister,
or combined controlled group, all of the employees of all of these corporations
would have to be taken into account in applying these tests [§ 414(b) ]. A comparable rule is provided in the case of partnerships and proprietorships which are under
common control [§ 414(c) ] (as determined under regulations), and all employees of
such organizations are to be treated for purposes of these rules as though they were
employed by a single person.
H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 50, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4670, 4716.
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Section 4001(b) serves the same ftinction with respect to the definitions
of "substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan" in section 4001(a) as
does Code section 414(c) with respect to Code section 414(b). In fact, ERISA
provides that the regulations implementing the single employer provision of.
section 4001(b) "shall be consistent and coextensive with regulations prescribed for similar purposes . .. under section 414(c)." 4 0 The definitions of
"'substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan" in section 4001(a)
contain
the same provision for single employer treatment of corporations as does
Code section 414(b). Just as section 414(c) gives broader application to the
rule of single employer treatment in section 414(b), the language of ERISA
section 4001(b) gives broader application to the "single employer" provisions
in the section 4001(a) definitions of "substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan." The effect of each supplementary provision is the same: to
extend the provision for single employer treatment of corporations under
common control to unincorporated trades and businesses. Like Code section
414(c), the "single employer" provision of section 4001(b) is a rule of construction which explains how companies under common control "shall be
treated." It is therefore apparent that section 4001(b) functions as a rule of
construction for the section 4001(a) definitions of "substantial employer" and
"multiemployer plan," which took their present form at the same time section 4001(b) with its "single employer" provision was added to ERISA.
To recapitulate, section 4001(a) defines "substantial employer" and "multiemployer plan" by reference to Code sections 414(o) and 1563(a). Code
sections 414(o) and 1563(a) provide for single employer treatment of corporations under common control. Section 4001(b) extends the definitions in section 4001(a) by providing single employer treatment for trades and businesses under common control (whether or not incorporated). Together, these
rules establish (1) that a pension plan maintained exclusively within a group
of commonly controlled companies cannot be a multiemployer plan; and (2)
that members of a commonly controlled group of companies participating in
a pension plan with companies outside of their control group shall be treated
as a single employer for the purposes of applying the substantial employer
and multiemployer rules under ERISA sections 4063 and 4064. 4 1 Against
this legislative background, it is inappropriate to view section 4001(b) as an
independent definition substantively governing Title IV.

40. ERISA, § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (Supp. V 1975).
41. This proposition would be consistent with the second part of section 414(b) which states:
With respect to a plan adopted by more than one such corporation, the minimum
funding standard of section 412, the tax imposed by section 4971, and the applicable limitations provided by section 404(a) shall be determined as if all such
employers were a single employer, and allocated to each employer in accordance
with regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
I.R.C. § 414(b) (emphasis added).
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The inadequacy of section 4001(b) to define the term "employer" to include all companies under common control further supports the conclusion
that it was never intended to do so. Like Code section 414(c), section
4001(b) does not apply to "members of a controlled group of corporations
(within the meaning of section 1563(a))." 42 Code section 414(b) and ERISA
sections 4001(a)(2) and (3) prescribe single employer treatment for groups of
corporations under common control. Code section 414(c) and section 4001(b)
are parallel, supplementary provisions which extend such treatment to
43
groups including unincorporated trades and businesses.
In applying section 4001(b) as if it were a substantive definition of
"employer" in section 4062, 44 the PBGC has ignored the fact that section
4001(b) was intended to supplement section 4001(a) and that section 4001(b)
is limited by its terms to groups including unincorporated trades and
businesses. Such an interpretation disregards the function of section 4001(b)
in relation to the definitions in section 4001(a) and wrenches a supplementary provision entirely out of its meaningful context.
B. The Effect of Section 4001(b) on
Section 4062
To justify its contention that section 4001(b) governs the meaning of
"employer" in section 4062 so as to impose termination liability on companies under common control with the company that actually established
and contributed to the plan, the PBGC relies on House-Senate Conference
Report comments which indicate that section 4001 was intended to affect the
application of sections 4062 and 4064. 4 5 The foregoing analysis indicates,

42. Compare I.R.C. § 414(c) with I.R.C. § 414(b).
43. Although both section 4001(b) of ERISA and Code section 414(c) apply to trades and
businesses "whether or not incorporated," this language does not make either provision applicable to common control groups consisting solely of corporations, but rather is intended to make
such sections applicable to commonly controlled groups comprised of a mix of corporations and
unincorporated trades and businesses as well as those groups comprised solely of unincorporated trades and businesses. An interpretation of Code section 414(c) and section 4001(b) to
apply to commonly controlled groups consisting exclusively of corporations would bring section
414(c) into conflict with section 414(b) and make the provisions for single employer treatment
contained in the section 4001(a) definitions superfluous. I.R.C. § 414(c) and ERISA, § 4001(b),
29 U.S.C. § 1301(b). But see T.D. 7388, Temp. Reg. § 11.414(c)-(2) (e) Ex. (5), 40 Fed. Reg.
51435, 51437 (1975).
44. See notes 24-28 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Ouimet case. Since the
Ouimet group consisted solely of corporations, the case highlights the PBGC's strained application of section 4001(b).
45. The House-Senate Conference Report on ERISA contains the following statement in
reference to section 4062:
In determining the employer who may be liable for the insurance coverage losses of
the corporation [PBGC], all trades or businesses (whether or not incorporated)
under common control are to be treated as a single employer. Trades or businesses
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however, that section 4001(b) functions by reference to section 4001(a) and
that to the extent that section 4001(b) affects the application of section 4062
it does so in tandem with section 4001(a). The intended relationship between section 4001 and sections 4062 and 4064 requires examination.
Section 4062 liability is restricted to employers who maintain a plan. The
Conferees' comment on section 4062 states that in determining the employer
who may be liable under that section, all trades and businesses under common control are to be treated as a single employer. 46 The PBGC relies on
this comment to contend that any company treated as a "single employer"
under section 4001(b) "maintains a plan" within the meaning of section 4062,
whether or not that company establishes or contributes to the plan, if at
least one member of the common control group to which that company belongs actually maintains the plan. This interpretation treats companies which
do not establish or contribute to a plan as maintaining the plan.
Throughout ERISA, maintaining a plan is associated with establishing
and contributing to pension plans 4 7-acts which employers who are merely
under common control do not undertake to do for their related firms unless they "adopt" a plan.4 8 For instance, section 402(a)(1) 4 9 requires that
"[e]very employee benefit plan be established and maintained pursuant to a
written instrument." This requirement is inconsistent with the contention
that companies under common control which do not adopt such an instrument are maintaining a plan. In addition to establishing or adopting a
plan, another requirement of maintaining a plan is contributing to it. In a
formal opinion letter, the PBGC stated: "Liability under ERISA Sections
4062 and 4064 applies to employers who 'maintained' a plan at the time such
plan was terminated ....
We conclude that an employer which contributes
50
to a plan 'maintains' it within the meaning of Section 4062 of the Act."

under common control may, for this purpose, include partnerships and proprietorships as well as corporations.
H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, S. REP. No. 93-1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 376, reprinted in [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5038, 5155. The comment on section 4064 [Liability of
Employers on Termination of Plans Maintained by More Than One Employer] states:
[Ilt should be noted that the affiliated employer rules are to apply in this area.
That is, if one member of an affiliated group has employer liability then that liability is to extend to the entire affiliated group. Also, the 30-percent-of-net-assets limit
is to apply with respect to the net assets of the entire group.
Id. at 380, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5159.
46. See note 45 supra.
47. See, e.g., ERISA, §§ 402(a)(1), 4021(b)(2), 4021(b)(4)-(b)(5), 4021(c)(3), 4023(a), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1102, 1321(b)(2), 1321(b)(4)-(b)(5), 1321(c)(3), 1323(a) (Supp. V 1975).
48. See note 41 supra.
49. ERISA, § 402(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
50. See PENSION BENEFIT GuARANTY CORPORATION, OPINION, LETTER No. 75-99, at 1-2
(1975).
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The legislative history of ERISA also indicates that maintaining a plan
requires contributing to it. An earlier version of section 4062, for example,
imposed liability only on "contributing" employers:
EMPLOYER LIABILITY

SEC. 414. (a) Subject to subsection (e), where the employer or
employers contributing to the terminating plan or who terminated
the plan are not insolvent.., such employer or employers (or any
successor in interest to such employer or employers) shall be liable
to reimburse the Corporation [PBGC] for any insurance benefits
paid by the Corporation [PBGC] .... 51
This evidence supports a common sense interpretation of the term "maintaining a plan" as used in ERISA to mean establishing, adopting, or contributing to that plan. The legislative history of Title IV gives no indication
that the adoption of section 4001(b) was intended to alter this meaning of
"maintain a plan" within section 4062.52 These considerations indicate
that
companies which do not establish or contribute to a plan cannot "maintain a
plan" within the meaning of sections 4062 and 4064.
Since the maintaining-a-plan requirement of section 4062 is not satisfied
in the case of a company that fails to participate in a pension plan, the
Conference Report comment on section 406253 must have had some purpose
other than that which the PBGC suggests. This purpose should be consistent
with the idea that maintaining a plan entails establishing and contributing to
the plan. When section 4062 is read in conjunction with section 4064, such a
purpose readily appears.
Section 4062 imposes liability on employers who maintained nonmultiemployer plans. Section 4064 provides for the allocation of termination
liability among employers maintaining a plan to which more than one
employer has made contributions at the time of terminationr A In order to
51. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 414(a), 120 CONG. REC. 4733 (1974) (emphasis added).
See also H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 401(b), 120 CONG. REc. 4987 (1974).
52. Congressman Gaydos offered the most detailed explanation of the conferees' intended
changes in Title IV:
Termination Insurance
The conference report, with some minor changes, adopts the House provisions
which provide for the creation of a Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, whose
purpose is to guarantee payments of benefits to participants in the event of termination of the pension plan. There are three new provisions in the conference report,
however, which are of interest.
120 CONG. REC. 29207 (1974). The three changes were provisions for (1) an advisory board to
the PBGC, (2) contingent liability insurance, and (3) private insurance.
53. Note 45 supra.
54. Section 4064 imposes liability by reference to section 4062: section 4064(b) provides
that, with certain exceptions, "the corporation [PBGC] shall determine the liability of each ...
employer in a manner consistent with section 4062." ERISA, § 4064(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1364(b)
(Supp. V 1975).
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properly apply sections 4062 and 4064 to employers contributing under a
plan maintained exclusively by a group of commonly controlled companies,
it is necessary to know whether these companies should be treated as a
single employer or a multiemployer group. 55 Section 4001 resolves this
problem: section 4001(a) excludes corporations under common control from
the definition of multiemployer plans, and section 4001(b) extends this exclusion by providing single employer treatment for unincorporated trades
and businesses under common control. Thus, by prescribing single employer
treatment for common control groups, section 4001 brings contributing
members of these groups under section 4062 rather than under section 4064.
If a plan were maintained by a group that included noncontrol group contributors as well as control group contributors, liability would attach under
section 4064. However, the control group would participate as a single
employer. As the legislative history indicates, sections 4001(a) and (b) affect
section 4062 by determining whether liability for a terminated plan arises
under section 4062 or section 4064.56
55. This distinction between the treatment of multiemployer plans and single employer
plans applies with respect to a variety of provisions in ERISA, and is maintained with a consistency that is somewhat surprising in light of the Act's other ambiguities. Compare ERISA, § 3
(37), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (Supp. V 1975), with ERISA § 210, 29 U.S.C. § 1060 (Supp. V 1975)
and ERISA, § 303(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(a) (Supp. V 1975). The legislative history indicates the
drafters' concern with this distinction.
In formulating the definition of "multi-employer plan" the Committee was
guided by the concept that such a plan, if sufficiently comprehensive in size or
scope, would be unlikely to terminate because its existence did not depend on the
economic fortunes of one employer or employer entity. The Committee recognized
that certain single employer plans have characteristics similar to those of the multiemployer type described in the definition, but, on balance, it is believed that
experience on plan terminations provides a reasonable basis for the distinction.
H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4639, 4648. One report on ERISA stated that "multiemployer plans represent a different
situation from single employer plans in a number of respects." STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON LABOR
OF SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974 at 5101 (Comm. Print
1976) (administrative recommendations to House-Senate conferees on ERISA). These manifestations of the legislative attempt to clearly distinguish treatment of the two categories of plans
indicate that in interpreting ERISA it is important to distinguish single employer plans from
multiemployer plans.
56. S.REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4973-74. The legislative history of section 4064 includes the following comment:
A multiemployer plan is a plan to which more than one employer is required
to contribute; is established or maintained pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between employee representatives and employers; and is a plan where
the benefits are payable with respect to each participant without regard to whether
the participant's employer is still making contributions to the fund. All employers
who are members of the same affiliated group (sec. 1504(a)) are to be treated as
one employer for the purposes of this definition.
The foregoing passage clarifies the intention of the drafters to use the reference to affiliated
employers to indicate that a plan maintained only by affiliated employers would not be subject
to liability under section 4064, pertaining to termination of multiemployer plans, but would be
subject to liability under section 4062.
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The PBGC's alternate interpretation of the effect of section 4001(b) on
section 4062 finds support in a fragment of the legislative history of section
4064 which states that the section 4064 liability of one member of a controlled group "is to extend to the entire affiliated group" and that the 30%
57
While it
limit on liability applies "to the net assets of the entire group."
is not directly applicable to section 4062, this language does appear to be
consistent with the PBGC's position that section 4062 liability extends to
noncontributing companies under common control-an interpretation which
is unsatisfactory because it is inconsistent with the requirement of maintaining a plan and with other provisions of ERISA.
The Conferees' comment on section 4064 should be interpreted consistently with the proposition that only contributing employers may be liable.
When so interpreted, the comment serves a specific function with respect to
section 4064(b), which states that the 30% "limitation described in section
4062(b)(2) shall be applied separately to each employer." 58 As applied to
commonly controlled companies contributing under a multiemployer plan,
the comment would simply direct the PBGC to assess the allocable share of
liability for these companies as a lump sum and combine the net worth of
the contributing companies under common control. This interpretation of
the comment is consistent with the single employer treatment prescribed for
such companies in section 4001(b) and the concept of maintaining a plan as
used throughout ERISA. Support for this interpretation appears in the other
sections of ERISA providing for allocation of obligations among control group
members. 59 Section 414(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, added to the
Code by section 1015 of ERISA, permits allocation of minimum funding requirements and employer deductions among only those members of a control group which have adopted a plan.
The most reasonable interpretation of section 4062 would limit the incidence of termination liability to companies that have established, adopted,
or contributed to a pension plan. In the context of commonly controlled
companies, only companies which adopted or contributed to a plan would be
liable. Such an interpretation is consistent with a common sense interpretation of the language of ERISA and its legislative history and avoids many of
the inconsistencies and pitfalls of the PBGC interpretation discussed below.
C. Incompatibility of the PBGC
Interpretationwith Other Provisions of ERISA
Apart from its intrinsic flaws, the PBGC interpretation of ERISA section
4062 (which would impose liability on companies within a common control
57. See note 45 supra.

58. ERISA, § 4064(b), 29 U.S.C. 1364(b) (Supp. V 1975).

59. I.R.C. § 414(b), reprinted at note 37 supra; ERISA, § 210(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1060(c)
(Supp. V 1975).
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group which have not participated in a terminated plan formerly maintained
by other members of the group) suffers from incompatibility with other provisions of ERISA. An inconsistency appears between the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 and ERISA section 407(d)(7). 69 Section 407, which
describes one of the restrictions which ERISA places on pension fund investment, generally limits the percentage of pension funds which may be invested in the securities or real property of an employer or employer-affilate
whose employees are covered by the particular plan. Specifically, section
407(d)(7) defines an employer-affiliate as "a member of any controlled group
of corporations . . . of which the employer who maintains a plan is a
member." 6' The distinction which this provision makes between a control
group member and an "employer who maintains a plan" is inconsistent with
the PBGC's contention that all members of a common control group are
"employers who maintain a plan."
The PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 is also inconsistent with
section 404 of the Internal Revenue Code (as amended by ERISA). Section
404(g) provides that "any amount paid by an employer under section 4062,
4063, or 4064 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 shall
be treated as a contribution to which this section applies by such employer
to or under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or annuity plan." 62 By
virtue of this provision an employer satisfying its section 4062 liability may
claim a tax deduction under section 404(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Such a deduction should logically be available to noncontributing companies
within a common cohtrol group which have incurred termination liability
pursuant to the PBGC interpretation of section 4062. However, certain regulations and revenue rulings indicate that companies under common control
cannot deduct payments made with respect to a plan which another member
of the group maintains for its employees. Therefore, although the question
has not been raised specifically with respect to section 404(g), the Internal
63
Revenue Service clearly disallows contributions in behalf of an affiliate.
The disallowance of this deduction is inconsistent with the imposition of liability on nonparticipating companies under common control and would impose an additional and inequitable financial burden on any nonparticipating
company which would be liable under the PBGC interpretation of section
4062.
60. ERISA, § 407(d)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(7) (Supp. V 1975).
61. Id.
62. I.R.C. § 404(g), as amended by ERISA, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 4081(a), 88 Stat. 103334.
63. Revenue Ruling 69-35, 1969-1 C.B. 117, states that "amounts contributed under this
plan by the corporation that is not the employer of those benefitting from the contributions are
not deductible under section 404 of the Code unless they constitute 'make-up' contributions
within the purview of section 404(a)(3)(B), and then only to the extent therein provided."
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In addition to its inconsistency with other sections ERISA, the PBGC
interpretation generates inconsistencies within section 4062. Subsection
(d)(2) of section 4062 provides that "[i]f an employer ceases to exist by reason
of a liquidation into a parent corporation, the parent corporation shall be
treated as the employer to whom this section applies." 64 Two corporations
related as parent and subsidiary are commonly controlled companies. 65 If,
as the PBGC claims, nonparticipating companies under common control are
liable for the pension obligations of member corporations, then this provision
for the liability of a parent upon liquidation is entirely superfluous. Under
the PBGC interpretation the parent corporation would be liable with or
without the liquidation of the subsidiary maintaining the plan. This inconsistency indicates that the drafters of Title IV did not envision across-the-board
liability for companies under common control.
In addition to generating statutory inconsistencies the PBGC interpretation creates a number of problems with respect to the procedures and
policies which Title IV of ERISA establishes. One procedural problem arises
because there is no set order in which the members of a group of commonly
controlled companies must answer for the liability of another member of the
group. Since the liability which the PBGC asserts against an entire group
may derive from the pension obligations of a single member, the assets of
the company that maintained the plan should be the first to be applied toward that liability. But because the PBGC has taken the position that members of a controlled group are jointly and severally responsible for termination liability, 66 it would be possible for the PBGC to impose liability and
satisfy a lien from nonparticipating companies and yet leave assets in the
company that actually established and contributed to the plan. Such a procedure seems patently inequitable.
A similar problem arises in attempting to calculate the upper limit of an
employer's termination liability. Section 4062 specifically sets the limit at
30% of an employer's net worth. 67 The PBGC's position is that application
of the 30% limit to companies under common control fixes the upper limit of
liability at 30% of the group's combined net worth. 68 This produces the
bizarre result that two companies of equal net worth (where each maintains a
pension plan but only one is under common control) might have substantially different termination liabilities.

64. ERUSA, § 4062(d)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(d)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
65. T.D. 7388, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,435 (1975) (temporary regulations issued under I.R.C. §
414).
66. See note 28 supra and accompanying text.
67. ERISA, § 4062(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (Supp. V 1975).
68. See Pre-Trial Memorandum of Plaintiff at 2-3, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
Tenn-ERO Corp., No. 75-1520-HL (D. Mass., filed May 26, 1976).
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A final but crucial incidence of incompatibility appears between the
PBGC interpretation of Section 4062 to extend liability to nonparticipating
companies under common control and some of the policies and purposes of
ERI-SA. In the Findings Declaration and Policy at the beginning of ERISA is
a legislative finding that "owing to the termination of plans before requisite
funds have been accumulated, employees and their beneficiaries have been
deprived of anticipated benefits." 69 As a legislative response to such termination losses, ERISA establishes a policy of improving the "equitable character and soundness" of private pension plans "by requiring them to invest the
accrued benefits of employees with significant periods of service, to meet
minimum standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination insurance." 70 In implementing such a policy, however, the drafters of ERISA
were acutely aware that placing unreasonable pension burdens on businesses
would discourage the voluntary 71 establishment and maintenance of pension
plans. A desire to encourage businesses to voluntarily maintain pension plans
produced a careful balancing of burdens in devising the machinery to carry
72
out the policies of ERISA.
The purposes set forth in the beginning of Title IV of ERISA indicate
that, in devising a system of plan termination insurance, Congress specifically balanced its desire to insure benefits against the financial burdens that
insurance would create. 73 The first objective of ERISA-encouraging
69. ERISA, § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (Supp. V 1975).
70. Id. § 2(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. V 1975).
71. H.R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 4670, 4677, serves as a reminder that ERISA did not make mandatory the establishment or maintenance of employee pension plans:
A fundamental aspect of present law, which the committee bill continues, is reliance on voluntary action by employers (and employees under contributory plans)
for the establishment of qualified retirement plans. The committee bill also continues the approach in present law of encouraging the establishment of retirement
plans which contain socially desirable provisions through the granting of tax inducements. In other words, under the new legislation as under the present law, no
one is compelled to establish a retirement plan.
72. This legislation provides urgently needed reform in the pension area. But, at the
same time, it continues the basic governmental policy of encouraging the growth
and development of voluntary private pension plans....
I want to emphasize that these new requirements have been carefully designed to
provide adequate protection for employees and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and development of private pension plans. It is axiomatic
to anyone who has worked for any time in this area that pension plans cannot be
expected to develop if costs are made overly burdensome, particularly for
employers who generally foot most of the bill. This would be self-defeating and
would be unfavorable rather than helpful to employees for whose benefit this legislation is designed. For this reason, we have been extremely careful to keep the
additional costs very moderate.
120 CoNG. REC. 29198, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5166-67 (remarks
of Rep. Ullman).
73. See S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., ist Sess. 26, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4838, 4862, which states that "[the Committee had concern that if the degree of
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employers to voluntarily maintain and continue pension plans-reflects a continuation of the previous governmental policy. 74 Unfortunately, there is an
unavoidable tension between encouraging maintenance of pension plans and
the second objective of insuring benefits by imposing liabilities on employers
when pension benefits are interrupted. The legislative history of Title IV
reflects the concern of the drafters that contingent liability would bring
75
these two objectives into conflict.
This contingent liability would be such as to make the financial
structure of any business appear unsound. Such liability would inevitably discourage additional employers from beginning new pension plans and existing plans from increasing benefits and thereby
76
increasing the employer's liability.
On one level, the third purpose of Title IV-holding down insurance
premiums-should encourage plan maintenance. However, employers absorb the cost of unfunded benefits. The resulting threat of large liability,
therefore, makes the low-premium policy inconsistent with the goal of encouraging voluntary continuation and maintenance of pension plans.
Since discouraging employers from voluntarily maintaining pension plans
is inconsistent with the purposes of Title IV, Title IV should be interpreted
in such a way as to avoid this result. Inconsistencies among the purposes of
Title IV require the PBGC and the courts to balance conflicting policies just
as Congress did. All interpreters of Title IV face the paradox that, while
employers must support the insurance system, there will ultimately be no
benefits if excessive financial burdens drive them out of the pension business.
It therefore appears that while the PBGC must impose liability upon
employers whose pension plans terminate, it should not extend that liability
beyond the specific requirements which Congress established to accomplish
a balance of obligations which would not discourage plan maintenance. The
conflicting purposes of Title IV argue against any interpretation of the Act to
assert employer liability which the statute does not clearly and directly impose.
liability was absolute to the extent of the employer's assets, it might drive some employers to
the brink of bankruptcy, impose substantial economic hardship, or discourage the establishment
of plans or the reasonable liberalization of benefits."
74. See note 71 supra.
75. H.R. REP. No. 93-533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 41, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4639, 4666.
Our primary consideration in writing pension reform legislation has been to help
assure that workers now covered by pension plans get their expected benefits. At
the same time, we have been careful not to inhibit benefit improvements for these
covered workers and not to retard the expansion of the pension system in such a
way as to deny retirement benefits to workers not now covered.
76. Id. at 42, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4667.
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PROBLEMS

The power to judicially review the constitutionality of legislation carries
with it a corollary requiring some degree of compatibility between a valid
statute and fundamental legal principles. An interpretation of ERISA section
4062 to impose liability on a company whose only relation to a terminated
plan is that it belongs to the same commonly controlled group as does the
company which actually maintained the plan collides with fifth amendment
protections. 77 This section of the Note explores the nature of the incompatibility between the PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 and the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection which the
7
Supreme Court has held to be applicable to business entities. "
A. Due Process: Vicarious Liability of
Companies Under Common Control
Liability which accrues to one person or entity as. a result of the proscribed behavior of another person or entity is vicarious. 79 When nonparticipating companies within a commonly controlled group have no contractual or other direct ties to a pension plan maintained by another company in
the group, the liability for that plan which the PBGC asserts against the
nonparticipating company is vicarious.
The constitutional guarantee of due process has led several courts to invalidate statutes imposing vicarious liability for proscribed behavior in which
80
the person subject to liability was not somehow consensually involved.
77. Equal protection applies to the federal government under the fifth amendment. Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
641-42 (1969); Schnielder v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
78. The business entities affected by the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 are corporations and trades and businesses under common control, as defined in sections 414(b) and 414(c)

of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court has specifically applied the equal protection and due
process guaranitees to corporations. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949),
invalidated, on equal protection grounds, an Ohio statute which imposed a discriminatory tax on
the in-state business of, foreign corporations. In an addendum to the majority opinion, Justice

Jackson stated:
The writer of the Court's opinion deems it necessary to complete the record by

pointing out why, in writing by assignment for the Court, he assumed without
discussion that the proteetions of the Fourteenth Amendment are available to a
corporation. It was not questioned by the State in this case, nor was it considered
by the courts below. It has consistently been held by this Court that the Fourteenth Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the laws, at least since
1886, and that it entitles them to due process of law, at least since 1889.
Id. at 574 (citations omitted).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1957).
80. Brindamour v. Murray, 7 Cal. 2d 73, 59 P.2d 1009 (1936) (vicarious liability for automobile owner when car was used by another person without owner's consent); Corley v.
Lewless, 227 Ga. 745, 182 S.E.2d 766 (1971) (statute imposing vicarious liability upon parent
for child's illegal behavior); Frankel v. Cone, 214 Ga. 733, 107 S.E.2d 819 (1959); Seleine v.
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These due process objections to vicarious liability appear in several distinguishable types of cases. 8 Recently, in the context of a forfeiture case, the
Supreme Court recognized that "it would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner whose property . . . had been taken from him
82
without his privity or consent."
A particularly explicit analysis of vicarious liability in terms of due process appears in an early 20th-century case. Daugherty v. Thomas 83 invalidated a Michigan statute that had imposed vicarious liability on the innocent
owner of an automobile for damages incurred when a garage employee, in
the process of testing the repaired car, struck and injured a pedestrian. The
trial court rendered judgment against the owner under a statute providing:
"The owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for any injury occasioned by
the negligent operation by any person of such motor vehicle." s The owner
thereafter attacked the judgment in the Michigan Supreme Court, contending that the statute was "void as . . . a deprivation of property without due
process of law within the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution." 8 5 Although the enactment of such a law was arguably within the
police powers of the state, the court held the statute to be violative of due
process:
To hold the statute ... constitutional is to hold a party absolutely
We think that the
liable for the negligent conduct of another ....
result of such holding would be to take the property of defendant
Thomas to pay for the wrongful and negligent act of another person

Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389, 206 N.W. 130 (1925); Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371, 140 N.W.
615 (1913).
In Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926), a decision dismissing a due process challenge to a statute that called for the seizure of an owner's car, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the owner's consent to the use of the car was a key factor:
It has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the
innocent owner or lienor to another who used it in violation of the revenue laws of
the United States is not a violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
81. Respondeat superior is a noteworthy instance of vicarious liability where due process
objections are unfounded. The master's consent to the employee's agency is a necessary element for imposing liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 221 (1957).
82. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689-90 (1974). In this case
the lessor of a yacht challenged Puerto Rican authorities who seized the yacht from its lessee
pursuant to a statute requiring government seizure of vessels used in transporting controlled
substances. While carefully limiting the rule, the Court upheld the forfeiture because the plaintiff had "voluntarily entrusted the lessees with possession of the yacht [thereby supplying the
requisite consent], and no allegation had been made or proof offered that the company did all it
reasonably could to avoid having its property put to an unlawful use." Id. at 690.
83. 174 Mich. 371, 140 N.W. 615 (1913).
84. Id. at 374, 140 N.W. at 616.
85. Id. at 376, 140 N.W. at 617.
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not sustaining to him the relation of servant, agent, or employee.
and repugnant to the provisions
Such a doctrine seems unnatural 86
of the Constitution here invoked.
The Michigan Supreme Court modeled its due process analysis on an
earlier case8 7 that had examined the constitutionality of a statute compelling
vehicle owners to indemnify drivers whenever injury resulted from the operation of the innocent owner's vehicle. Justice Loomis had found liability
under this statute unsupportable:
Such a result is in itself so absurd as to show either that the statute
ought not to be so construed as to produce it, or that, if this be a
correct construction, it is so far void, either as manifestly against
natural justice, or as violating that article of the Constitution which
forbids the taking away of any person's property "without due process of law." If such a law, so construed, were to be held valid,
then a law that should by a merely arbitrary rule make one man
liable for the debts of another would be valid. Indeed, there is no
limit that could be put to the most arbitrary acts of the legislature
in making one man liable for the acts of another. 88
Daugherty viewed due process as providing substantive protection
against any "merely arbitrary rule" that makes "one man liable for the debts
of another." As this principle has developed, vicarious liability has come to
be recognized as a deprivation of due process when such liability can be
imposed for acts in which an individual was not causally or consensually
involved. 89 Daugherty specifically established that mere ownership is an
insufficient basis upon which to impose vicarious liability.90
Under a logical extension of the Daugherty principle the constitutionality
of the PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 is questionable. In assert-

86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 390, 140 N.W. at 622.
Camp v. Rogers, 44 Conn. 291 (1877).
174 Mich. 371, 380-81, 140 N.W. 615, 618-19 (1913).
See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
In another motor vehicle case, Seleine v. Wisner, 200 Iowa 1389, 1392, 206 N.W. 130,
131 (1925), the court stated:
It is obvious, if damages result from the use of an automobile driven by a person
without the owner's consent, that the owner would not be liable, and a statute
which attempts to fix liability on such owner without reference to his consent in the
operation of the car, would result in taking his property without due process of law.
90. A small group of cases which might appear to undercut this principle subject keepers of
dangerous animals to absolute liability. E.g., Vaughan v. Miller Bros. "101" Ranch Wild West
Show, 109 W. Va. 170, 153 S.E. 289 (1930). These cases are distinguishable from automobile
ownership cases because they involve no intervening agency, such as an unauthorized driver,
which bears actual responsibility for the liability that accrues.
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ing vicarious liability against companies under common control, the PBGC
relies solely upon the ties of ownership that exist among a commonly controlled group of companies. Because nonparticipating companies lack consensual involvement with the pension plan maintained by another company
in the control group, the PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 liability operates as an arbitrary rule making "one man liable for the debts of
another"' 9 and runs counter to the constitutional principles applied in
Daugherty and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 92 It is therefore doubtful whether the PBGC interpretation extending termination liability to nonparticipating companies under common control complies with fifth
amendment constitutional guarantees. 93
B. Equal Protection: Discriminatory Treatment of
Companies Under Common Control
An interpretation of section 4062 of ERISA to impose vicarious liability
on nonparticipating companies under common control raises an equal protection problem 94 by treating individual owners differently from owners who
are classified as trades and businesses. A simple example will illustrate the
difference in treatment which the PBGC interpretation affords businesses as
opposed to natural persons. Assume that corporation ABC, a company maintaining a pension plan, has termination liability. If X, an individual, owns
80% of ABC, X is not liable. However, if Y, a corporation or other trade or
business, owns 80% of ABC, then (1) it is under common control with
ABC, 95 and (2) it is liable under the PBGC interpretation of Title IV.

91. By imposing termination liability on commonly controlled companies irrespective of
privity or consent to a pension plan, section 4062 liability is not a burden directly on an ownership interest-as, for instance, a property tax. Individual owners (classified as neither trades and
businesses nor corporations) are not liable on the basis of their ownership interest in the stock
of a company with plan termination liability. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
92. 416 U.S. 663 (1974). See comment at note 82 supra.
93. Another due process objection may also arise here. Section 4062 liability has a retrospective effect upon companies terminating pension plans which they established prior to ERISA's enactment. Hale, The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause (pt. 3), 57 HAsv. L. REv.
852, 890 (1944), indicates that the due process clause of the fifth amendment prevents Congress
from impairing vested contract rights in an unreasonable manner. Hochman, The Supreme
Court and the Constitutionalityof Retroactive Legislation, 73 HAtv. L. REv. 692 (1960), identifies three factors which are useful in determining the reasonableness of retroactive legislation:
(1) the public interest which the statute promotes; (2) the degree to which the statute impairs a
preexisting right; and (3) the character of the preexisting right.
Additionally, courts may consider the substantive, as opposed to remedial, nature of the
-contractual impairment and the direct, as opposed to incidental, interference with contractual
obligations. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648,
680-81 (1935).
94. See cases cited at note 77 supra.
95. See note 65 supra.
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The question posed by this discriminatory treatment resulting from the
PBGC interpretation of section 4062 is whether business entities, that is
trades and businesses (whether or not incorporated) and corporations, as opposed to natural persons, are denied equal protection of the law. This issue
has arisen before in the context of laws treating individuals and corporations
differently. One such case, State v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis
Railway Co., 96 involved an equal protection challenge to a statute prohibiting corporations, but not natural persons, from discharging employees for
exercising certain civil liberties. The court set forth what has become the
standard test of statutory validity:
[Tihe classification must not be mere arbitrary selection. It must
have'some basis which bears a natural and reasonable relation to
the [legislative] object sought to be accomplished, and there must
be some good and valid reason why the particular individual or
class upon whom the benefit is conferred, or who are subject to
the burden imposed, not given to or imposed
upon others, should
97
be so preferred or discriminated against.
The statute failed to meet this standard and was invalidated as a denial of
equal protection. The statute had distinguished corporate and noncorporate
employers, apparently with the legislative objective of preventing employers
from impairing the civil rights of their employees. The court, however, saw
no reason for differentiating between types of employers in order to achieve
this objective,9 8 and held that the statutory classification lacked a rational
basis. 9
When a rational basis for differentiating corporations from other business
entities is apparent, however, similar classifications have been upheld. Mallinckrodt Chemical Works v. Missouri10 0 involved an equal protection challenge to a state statute requiring corporations to file certain affidavits on an
annual basis. The Court held that corporations could be made to file affidavits from which other business entities were exempt when the particular
statute's objective was to aid the prohibition of trusts and other combinations
in restraint of trade. Corporations could act only by their agents, and often
the agency could be neatly disguised. The Court concluded

96. 124 Tenn. 1, 135 S.W. 773 (1911).
97. Id. at 10, 135 S.W. at 775.
98. Id. at 14, 135 S.W. at 776.
99. "The discriminations, which are open to objection, are those where persons engaged in
the same business are subject to different restrictions, or held entitled to different privileges
under the same conditions." Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703, 709 (1885), quoted in State
v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 124 Tenn. 1, 11, 135 S.W. 773, 775 (1911).
100. 238 U.S. 41 (1915).
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that, for these and other reasons, corporations are peculiarly apt
instruments for establishing and effectuating those trusts and combinations against which the prohibition of the statute is directed,
that their business affiliations are not so easily discovered and
traced as those of individuals, and that there was therefore a peculiar necessity and fitness in annually requiring from each corporation a solemn assurance of its non-participation in the prohibited
practices. 10 1
02
In a more recent case, Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,'
the Supreme Court sustained state legislation which prohibited the state
from imposing on natural persons a personal property tax levied against corporations. The legislative objective of raising revenue by means of the tax
appeared at first glance to afford little reason for distinguishing between corporations and individuals. Nevertheless, the Court found a sufficient rational
basis for the discriminatory treatment. Since the tax could only be administered feasibly with respect to corporate personalty, administrative convenience gave the statutory classification a rational basis and thus defeated the
03
equal protection challenge.1
The PBGC interpretation of section 4062 as imposing termination liability on nonparticipating companies under common control differentiates be10 4
tween business entities (whether or not incorporated) and natural persons.
To determine whether this statutory classification complies with the fifth
amendment's implied guarantee of equal protection,10 5 courts will first have
to examine the purposes of section 4062's imposition of termination liability.
If the differentiation between business entities and natural persons should
fail to reasonably promote any statutory purpose underlying section 4062 of
ERISA, then the courts should reject the interpretation as a denial of equal
protection.
The legislative history of ERISA suggests at least one purpose for imposing termination liability in section 4062. One function which Title IV of
ERISA assigns to the PBGC is guaranteeing payment of all nonforfeitable
benefits under pension plans to which ERISA applies. 10 6 The PBGC is empowered to collect premiums from employers. maintaining pension plans in
order to fund the payment of pension benefits. 10 7 Because the PBGC
guarantees the payment of these benefits, employers might be tempted to

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 53.
410 U.S. 356 (1973).
See id. at 365.
See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
See note 77 supra.
ERISA, § 4022(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (Supp. V 1975).
ERISA, § 4006(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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promise benefits which they could not fund, thereby passing on the costs of
promised benefits via high insurance premiums to other employers. One
purpose of termination liability under section 4062 was, therefore, to prevent employers from promising benefits beyond their means or intentions in
reliance upon Title IV's provision of plan termination insurance. 10 8
Another reason for imposing liability on employers whose plans terminated was to make them absorb part of the cost of the insured benefits so
that the rates for premiums paid by other employers would not be excessive.
High premium rates for insuring the payment of pension plan benefits discourage the establishment and continuation of private pension plans.' 0 9
However, the purpose of maintaining low premium rates for plan termination insurance does not appear to justify a statutory classification that subjects business entities (but not natural persons) to termination liability when
both are in exactly the same relation to a company with plan termination
liabilities. Since companies owned and controlled directly by natural persons
are equally subject to temptations of promising pension benefits in reliance
upon plan termination insurance, such a classification scheme lacks a rational
basis. Consequently, if the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 is adopted,
it may subject those provisions to invalidation for denying equal protection
of the law.
V. POLICY OBJECTIONS
Apart from questions regarding its validity, the PBGC interpretation of
section 4062 of ERISA to impose liability on nonparticipating companies
under common control conflicts with several basic policies which guide the
legislative regulation of businesses. Statutes should ordinarily be construed
so as to be consistent with long-standing legislative policies. 110 However,
the tendency of the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 of ERISA to undermine free choice among forms of business ownership, limited corporate
liability, and the rescue of failing companies, makes it inconsistent with
well-established policies.
108. S. REP. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 87, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4890, 4991.
Since there would be a possibility of abuse by solvent employers who terminate
a plan and shift the financial burden to the insurance program, notwithstanding
their own financial ability to continue funding the plan, the conference bill imposes
liability on employers whose plans terminate, to reimburse the program for benefits
paid by the corporation.
120 CONG. REc. 29931 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Williams), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5185.
109. Compare ERISA, § 4002(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975) with ERISA, §

4002(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
110. See E. CEAwFoRD, THE CONSTRUCnON OF STATTrEs 371 (1940): "TMhe general policy
of the state, or the established policy of the legislature as revealed by its legislation generally,
should be considered in the construction of statutes" (footnotes omitted).
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A. Impact on Forms of Ownership
It is questionable whether legislation regulating pensions should substantially affect an employer's choice of the form in which he carries on his
business. Yet, under the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 to impose
across-the-board liability on control group members, the extent to which the
owner of an 80% interest in a company may be liable for that company's plan
termination obligations may depend on whether, the owner is a corporation,
an unincorporated trade or business, or an individual investor.
An example may illustrate how under the PBGC interpretation the extent of termination liability depends on the form of business. Assume that
0, 0, and 02 are individuals. 0 owns 100% of B corporation. 0, owns 99%
of O-P partnership which owns 100% of B, corporation. 02 owns 100%
of C corporation which owns 100% of B 2 corporation:
0

01

0

B

B1

B2

02

Therefore, 0, 01, and 02 control B, B 1, and B 2 respectively. Assuming that
B, B1, and B 2 all have terminated qualified pension plans in which guaranteed benefits exceed plan assets, the PBGC would pay those benefits. The
liability of 0, 01, and 02 to the PBGC under Title IV would then be as
follows:
(1) Respecting B corporation: O's losses are limited to his interest in the
stock; 0 is not personally liable.
(2) Respecting B 1 corporation: Since O-P's liability is not limited to its
interest in the stock of B 1 because it is a "trade or business," 01's assets in
O-P are subject to liability. If the PBGC overestimates the net worth of O-P,
0 's liability may even extend to his other assets.
(3) Respecting B2 corporation: Despite the fact that C has exactly the
same ownership interest in B, as 0 does in B, C's losses are not limited to
its interest in the stock of B2, and O2's assets in C are subject to liability.
However, 02 is not personally liable.
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As this hypothetical illustrates, under the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 of ERISA the extent of liability imposed on an owner may vary according to the form of ownership in situations where both the obligations
and ownership interests are otherwise similar. The PBGC interpretation of
section 4062 to extend liability through a controlled group of businesses or
corporations makes individual ownership preferable and may discourage
ownership through commonly controlled companies. The discouragement of
ownership through companies under common control in no way relates to
the purpose of legislation which was designed to secure the more equitable
administration of pension plans.

B. Limiting Limited Liability
Among the recognized attributes of a corporation are its separate legal
identity and the limitation of liability for shareholders to the amount contributed to the corporate enterprise.1 11 Nevertheless, in certain exceptional
circumstances the corporate entity may be disregarded and shareholders
held personally liable for the corporation's obligations.1 1 2 The PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 to impose the termination liability of any
member of a control group on all companies within that group disregards the
principles of corporate identity and limited liability. 1i 3 The advisibiity of
applying such a scheme to companies under common control depends upon
whether ownership by a business entity, as opposed to an individual, is sufficient justification for piercing the corporate veil.
In 1929, Professors William 0. Douglas and Carrol Shanks published the
seminal article on piercing the corporate veil in situations involving corporations under common control."14 Within this context the article recognized
that the principle of limited shareholder liability is based on the premise
that "lilt is legitimate for a man or a group of men to stake only a part of
their fortune on an enterprise." 115 The authors noted further that in the
case of parent and subsidiary corporations, "ownership alone does not suffice
to destroy the non-conductor of liability."116 A consensus exists within de-

111. See

1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 14 (rev.

perm. ed. 1974).
112 Id. § 41.
113. See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
114. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39
YALE L.J. 193 (1929).
115. Id. at 193-94.
116. Id. at 196. The authors proceeded to restate this point:"It is tacit in that conclusion that
the exercise of the 'control' which stock ownership gives to the stockholders, either by statute,
judicial decision, or normal corporation procedure, will not create liability beyond the assets of
the subsidiary." Id.
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cisional law as to what factors may justify piercing the corporate veil. 1 1 7
United States v. Milwaukee RefrigeratorTransit Co. 118 set forth the general
rule:
[A] corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general
rule, and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when
the notion of legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the
corporation as an association of persons.11 9
By ignoring these factors, the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 destroys the limited liability that would normally exist among corporations
under common control. The corporate veil is pierced upon a showing of
nothing more than common control; mere ownership triggers the imposition
of termination liability on those companies not participating in the plan
maintained by another member of the control group.
By enacting a statute that disregards the limited liability of corporations
under common control, Congress would have deprived courts of the power
to determine when and if equitable consideratons required a piercing of the
corporate veil. Because the PBGC interpretation of section 4062 strips this
remedy of its equitable character, one may question whether Congress actually intended the statutory provision to have this effect. Since the more than
20
5,000 pages of legislative history on ERISA which Congress has compiled 1
do not mention this possible effect, the inquiry must be indirectly pursued
by examining the way in which the drafters developed the section 4001(b)
provision respecting single employer treatment of trades and businesses
under common control. A series of cross references between ERISA and the
Internal Revenue Code 121 indicate that section 1563(a) of the Code served
as a model for the single employer treatment that section 4001(b) prescribes
for companies under common control. The definitions and special rules in
section 1563 were devised for use in determining whether certain tax benefits highlighted in section 1561(a) of the Code would be available to corporations within a common control group. Section 1561 of the Internal Revenue Code was added in 1963 to assure that these tax benefits would aid

117. 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAWv OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§

41 (rev.

perm. ed. 1974).
118. 142 F. 247 (E.D. Wis. 1905).
119. Id. at 255.

120. STAFF OF SUBCOMIA. ON LABOR OF SENATE COMI. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
93D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGIsLATIxvE HISTORY OF EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT of 1974 (Comm. Print 1976).

121. Compare ERISA, § 4001(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (Supp. V 1975) and ERISA, § 4001(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (Supp. V 1975) with I.R.C. §§ 414(b)-(c), 1563(a).
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small business corporations and not "'large organizations which operate
through multiple corporations and which are not in reality 'small businesses."'' 122 This revision was the beginning of single-corporation tax treatment for corporations under common control. Although it disregarded corporate boundaries, the rule did not pierce the corporate veil because-it did not
hold shareholders liable for corporate obligations. Since section 1563 of the
Internal Revenue Code serves as a model for section 4001(b) of ERISA, it
seems unlikely that section 4001(b) was intended to destroy limited
shareholder liability.
Although section 4001(b) was a last minute addition,' 2 3 there is no evidence in the legislative history of ERISA to indicate that Congress intended
to make any major changes in the final stages prior to the passage of the
statute. Those changes made in Title IV were relatively insignificant. 124 No
provision of ERISA's Title IV specifically authorizes the piercing of the corporate veil-not even section 4064, which imposes termination liability on
25
employers who maintain multiemployer plans.1
C. Saving Failing Companies
A further policy question respecting the desirability of imposing liability
on nonparticipating companies under common control arises in the context
of a failing company. 126 In this situation, it is often possible (and of benefit
to everyone) for a thriving corporation to purchase the stock and assume
control of a failing company in order to effect a turnaround. The rescue of a

122. S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 134, reprintedin [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2027, 2166.
123. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 52 supra.
125. Cf. notes 53-59 supra and accompanying text (discussion of the operation of section
4064 in relation to section 4062).
126. International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930), defined a failing company as
"a corporation with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so remote that it
faced the grave probability of a business failure with resulting loss to its stockholders and injury
to the communities where its plants were operated." The case developed the "failing company
doctrine" which serves as a defense to an antitrust violation charged under the Clayton Act. For
discussions of the failing company defense see Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226, 339-47 (1960); Comment, "Substantially to
Lessen Competition.
Current Problems of Horizontal Mergers, 68 YALE L.J. 1627, 166268 (1959).
Justice Stewart gave a perceptive analysis of the failing company doctrine when he
stated that "[it is, in a sense, a 'lesser of two evils' approach, in which the possible threat to
competition resulting from an acquisition is deemed preferable to the adverse impact on competition and other losses if the company goes out of business." United States v. General
Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 507 (1974). Stewart's analysis applies equally well to a company
acquiring a failing company with Title IV termination liability. In this case a nonassertion of
liability against the acquiring company may very well be the lesser of two evils.
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failing company saves jobs and permits continuation of employee pension
plans.
Under ERISA any company contemplating this inherently risky venture
must consider contingent pension liabilities in assessing the financial situation of the company to be acquired. 127 Since a stock purchase would bring
the purchasing company and the failing company under common control, the
PBGC interpretation of section 4062 of ERISA would subject 30% of the
acquiring company's net worth to termination liability. The acquiring company might also be subject to a lien against its other assets for the entire
12 8
liability of the failing company.
The impact of this increase in liability and the assertion of this liability
against an acquiring corporation would discourage a potential purchaser from
entering into a transaction to save a failing company with potential pension
liabilities. By discouraging the acquisition, the imposition, of termination liability may well increase the failing corporation's likelihood of bankruptcy.
Permanent insufficiency of pension funds could follow from such adjudications of bankruptcy, and eventually create an increase in premiums for contingent liability insurance under ERISA section 4006(a)1 2 9 for all employers
maintaining pension plans. Discouraging the rescue of failing companies
is inconsistent with the purposes of ERISA Title IV: "to encourage the
continuation and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans" and "to
provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits to
participants and beneficiaries." 1 30

VI. CONCLUSION

The PBGC interpretation of ERISA section 4062 to impose termination liability on nonparticipating companies under common control has questionable stalutory justification, is inconsistent with the purposes and various
specific provisions of ERISA, and is subject to constitutional challenges.
Furthermore, the PBGC interpretation has several undesirable impacts.
First, it discourages any common control corporation not currently providing pension benefits from establishing and maintaining a pension plan.
Even after contingent liability insurance becomes available, a company
under common control would have to insure against termination'liabilities of
all pension plans maintained among control group members as well as its
own. Second, it endangers the financial well-being of common control
127. Kaufman, ERISA: The Effect of Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions of Plans; Plan
Terminations, 34 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 1335, 1352 (1976).
128. See ERISA §§ 4062, 4068, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1362, 1368 (Supp. V 1975).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (Supp. V 1975).
130. ERISA, § 4002(a)(1)-(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. V 1975).
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groups by imposing a potential liability of 30% of their net worth. This potential liability might cause a group to divest itself of a company with
foreseeable pension liabilities. Such forced divestiture could undermine the
financial structure of the divested company, causing actual termination of its
plan.
Liability, which if reasonable may merely deter plan termination, if unreasonable may produce total abandonment of pension plans. The drafters of
ERISA tried to avoid the problem of unreasonable burdens.' 31 Interpreting
ERISA so as to impose unnecessary and discriminatory burdens may defeat
its legislative intent. Since the advantage of reducing the burdens of plan
termination insurance is outweighed by the disadvantages of imposing termination liability on nonparticipating companies under common control, section 4062 of ERISA should be-construed to impose termination liability only
on those companies which actually participated in the terminated pension
plan.
MARY LYNN DuHM"

131. See note 72 supra.

